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Nature of the Case
The District Court, the Honorable Robert G. Newhouse presiding, entered its Order
Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation December 16, 1988.

The Order of

Probation was for a 5 year period. The Order Withholding Judgment was for the same
5 year period.

The Order Withholding Judgment required that the case "shall be

dismissed" upon its expiration date following a showing that the Appellant had complied
with the terms of the Order of Probation.

A Second Amended Order Withholding

Judgment and Ordering Probation was entered June 21, 1990. The probation terms
were enlarged to allow the Appellant unsupervised contact with minors in public places,
and with his new nuclear family. The order for mandatory dismissal was maintained.
On October 9, 1992, the District Court dissolved and terminated the Order of Probation.
The Order of Withheld Judgment was also entered October 9, 1992. The District Court
held that the Appellant had substantially complied with the Order of Probation. This is a
final order. It was not appealed. Based upon this order, the Appellant is entitled to the
dismissal of this action and restoration of his civil rights pursuant to Sec. 18-310(2), I.C.

The Appellant moved to Montana in 1999. As a resident of Montana, the Appellant filed
a motion for dismissal, pro se, December 14, 2010.

The District Court denied the

motion, asserting jurisdiction and discretion pursuant to Section 19-2604(1), I.C. The
District Court does not have jurisdiction to amend or modify a final order. It does not
have the discretion to amend or modify a final order. Judicial discretion was properly
exercised by the original District Court. The District Court should be required to comply
with the Orders of Judge Newhouse and dismiss the case.

Factual and Procedural Background
On December 16, 1988, the District Court, the Honorable Robert G. Newhouse
presiding, entered its Order Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation.

The

Appellant was placed on probation for 5 years and was given a withheld judgment for
the same 5 year period. Upon expiration of the Order Withholding Judgment, and upon
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a showing that Mr. Dieter had complied with the terms of the Order of Probation, the
Order Withholding Judgment required that his case be dismissed.(R.000010A-00010D).
Mr. Dieter pled guilty to the crime of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen.
The minor was age 15 when their relationship began in 1986. She was age 16 when it
ended in 1987. Pre-Sentence Report pg.1, (R.000152).

She was age 17 when the

District Court entered the Order Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation. The
Order of Probation did not allow the Appellant to have contact with the minor, until she
turned 18, without the consent of the probation officer.

See Order Withholding

Judgment and Order of Probation, paragraph 3, 5, pg 2, (R.000010B).

A Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) was submitted to the District Court. Defendant's Exhibit
C, PSR, (R.000151-000162). It reported that the minor had been abandoned by her
parents who were driving truck, long haul. Further, that the minor had been beaten by
her violent brother while the two were alone. PSR, pg 1-pg 3, (R.000152-000154). The
Appellant acted to protect the minor from her abusive brother and helped obtain foster
care for her.

The Presentence Investigator recommended probation as set forth in the Pre-Sentence
Report. Specific consideration was given to the Appellant's lack of any prior record, that
there was no force in the offense, the Appellant's own parenting relationship with his
minor son of a prior marriage, and the Appellant's current stable employment. PSR, pg
11, (R.000153).

A Psychological Evaluation, dated November 11, 1988, was submitted to the District
Court. Defendant's Exhibit B, (R.000140-000150).

It recommended probation with a

closely supervising correctional professional, no unsupervised contact with minor
females, and a court ordered, structured treatment program. (R.000147-000148).

The recommendations for probation were adopted by the District Court as follows:
"AND WHEREAS, THE District Court, having ascertained the desirability
of granting this petition for probation, does hereby order and decree that
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he be placed on probation, and judgment is hereby withheld for a period of
5 years, under the following conditions:
1. That the probation is granted to and accepted by the petitioner ...
2. That the probationer shall be under the legal custody and control of
the Director of Probation and Parole ... " Order, pg 2, (R000109).
The Order of Probation included Specific Conditions. Those directly related to the
offense were:
"3. Special Conditions, to wit;
2. The probationer shall complete any training or counseling program
established by the probation officer.
5. The probationer shall have no contact with any minor children or the
victim, until she turns 18 years of age without the consent of his
probation officer;" Ibid.
The Order Withholding Judgment stated:
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon the expiration of the period
of this order withholding judgment, or the earlier termination thereof, and
upon written showing by or on behalf of the defendant that he has fully
complied with the terms of his probation, then, and in that event, this
action shall be dismissed." Ibid, pg 3. (R.00011 O).
On January 10, 1989, the Order of Probation was amended to allow the Appellant to
have unrestricted visitation with his minor son. Amended Order Withholding Judgment
and Order of Probation. (R.000011).

On June 21, 1990, a Second Amended Order Withholding Judgment and Ordering
Probation was entered. (R000116-000118). The probation terms were enlarged to
allow the Appellant unsupervised contact with minors who were with their parents, or
when in public places where there are minors such as movie theatres, sports activities,
church activities, school functions, etc.
contact with his new nuclear family.

The Appellant was allowed unsupervised

By the amended provisions, the District Court

determined that the Appellant was a low-risk repeat offender. The decision was based
in part upon the report of Health Psychology Inc., Dr. Lynn F. Ellis, C.A.C., PhD.,
Defendant's Exhibit A. (R000139).

Paragraph 5 in the original order was removed.

The requirement of no contact with any minor children, and no contact with the minor
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until she turned 18, without the consent of the probation officer, was deleted. Second
Amended Order Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation. Pg. 2. (R.000117).

The District Court ordered the following amendments:
"1. Paragraph 5 in each order is deleted. In lieu thereof:
5. The probationer shall have no sexual contact with a minor. The
probationer shall have unsupervised contact with his own son. He
shall have unsupervised contact with minors in public places where
there are minors such as movie theatres, sports activities, church
He shall have unsupervised
activities, school functions, etc.
contact with minors where the minors are accompanied by their
custodial parent or parents.
2. A paragraph nine will be added to the Special Conditions to read as follows:
9.

Lori Knie, a single parent, and her ten year old daughter, Terry
Knie, may reside with Philip Dieter at his residence at 904 Logan,
Boise, Idaho 83713, without supervision upon the following
conditions.

First, Lori Knie discuss with her daughter what proper and improper
touching by an adult is. She is not to refer to the circumstances of
Mr. Dieter's conviction or parole. The prosecution may have a
witness to this discussion who shall be someone other that the
probation officer.
Second, the probationer shall be required to take a polygraph test. ...
Third, the probationer shall be required to take a plethysmograph
test. ..
Fourth, the probationer shall continue his appointments with Health
Psychology, Inc, for the next six to eight weeks where education
and training occur with Mr. Dieter's now nuclear family in
communications skills and risk factor monitoring.
Fifth, at the end of the six to eight week period, a hearing shall be
held in August to review the test results and the living experience of
the probationer's nuclear family to determine whether this order
shall become permanent.
Sixth, should a violation of probation occur prior to August 1990,
nothing herein shall prevent the Prosecutor from bringing a Motion
to revoke probation." Ibid, paragraph 1 and 2, (R.000022-000023).
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The Second Amended Order Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation became
final. It was not appealed.
Two years later, with one year remaining on the term of probation, the State of Idaho
filed a Motion and Order for Bench Warrant for Probation Violation alleging violations of
the original Order Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation. Motion and Order for
Bench Warrant, (R.000036-R.000038). The motion sought revocation of Appellant's
probation and imposition of sentence, i.e. one year of incarceration. The Bench warrant
was entered by the District Court, ex parte. Ibid, pg 4. (R.000038).

On September 22, 1992, the Appellant's Motion Opposing Order for Bench Warrant for
Probation Violation was filed. (R.000039). The Motion represented that the Appellant
had complied with all the terms of probation for the original order, and as amended, and
completed 4 years of the 5 year probation period. These facts were set forth in the
Affidavit of Philip Dieter, (R000051), the Affidavit of Lori Dieter, (R.000041), and the
Affidavit of Paul Richard Bearce, the Defendant's employer, (R.000047). The Affidavit
of Philip Dieter established that the alleged violations were in error and the Court so
ruled. The alleged violations were based upon the absolute restrictions of the original
order, not the expanded terms of the Second Amended Order. Ibid.

On October 8, 1992, a hearing was held before Judge Newhouse who determined that
the Appellant had not violated the probation conditions set forth in the Second Amended
Order Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation.

The Order Terminating

Probation, Dissolving Order of Probation, and Entering Order Withholding Judgment
was entered October 9, 1992. (R.00059-00060). It stated:
"1. This Court entered its Order Withholding Judgment and Order of
Probation December 16, 1988, which included that upon the
expiration of the Order Withholding Judgment or the earlier
termination thereof, and upon a proper showing of compliance by the
Defendant, this action would be dismissed.
2. Approximately four years of the five year probation has elapsed and
the Defendant has substantially complied with the said Order.
3. The fifth year of the Order of Probation is terminated.
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4. The Order of Probation as entered and as subsequently amended is
hereby dissolved.
5. As a consequence and pursuant to the Order entered December 16,
1988, the original Judgment and as it was subsequently amended is
withheld, and the clerk is appropriately directed to do so.
6. Nothing herein will prevent the Court from considering the Defendant's
record upon sentencing should he be found guilty of any subsequent
offense." Ibid, pg 2, (R. 00060).
By this order, the Court determined that the Appellant no longer presented a risk to reoffend.

In 1993, the Idaho Legislature passed the Sex Offender Registration Act, I.C. §§ 188301 to 18-8311. 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 155, § 1, p. 391. The enactment date of
the Act was July 1, 1993. I.C. § 18-8304(1)(d). This Act does not apply to Mr. Dieter as
his Order of Probation was dissolved and terminated on October 9, 1992 prior to the
enactment date of July 1, 1993. State of Idaho vs, Hartwig, 2011 Opinion No.9, p.2.
(Idaho 2011).

On September 16, 1999, the Appellant filed a Motion for Expungement. (R00061). The
motion was denied December 30, 1999. (R00068).

In 1999, the Defendant moved to Anaconda, Montana. (Tr. Pg 9, In.23; Pg 10, In.5).
He has resided and worked in Montana at all times thereafter. He now lives in Lewistown,
Montana with his wife Kellie Dieter. They married two years ago. They reside at 404 W.
Morase St, Lewistown, Montana where they are purchasing their home. She is employed
at the county hospital, as a manager for environmental services.

The Appellant is a

registered voter in the State of Montana. (Tr. Pg. 12, In.22 - Tr. Pg. 13, In.17).

On December 14, 2010, eighteen years after the Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving
Order of Probation, and Entering Order Withholding Judgment was entered, the
Appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss, pro se. (R000069).

On December 20, 2010, the

District Court entered its Notice of Intent to Deny Motion to Dismiss. (R000071R000074).
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The District Court stated:
"Although the Defendant claims he has fully complied with the terms of his
probation, the record does not fully support this assertion. Based upon
the partial records before this Court, it appears that on August 17, 1992, a
Motion and Order for Bench Warrant for PV (parole violation) was filed,
and a Bench Warrant issued. Although the file does not contain the
disposition of this Motion, it suggests that the Petitioner failed to abide by
the terms of his probation. Nevertheless, on October 9, 1992, the Court
entered an Order Terminating Probation and entering the withheld
judgment, noting that the Defendant had "substantially complied" with the
order of probation and withheld judgment.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the record in this matter, the Court finds that the Defendant
has not made a satisfactory showing that he completed his probation while
abiding by the terms and condition of probation at all times, or that
dismissal of his charge is in the public interest." (R.00072-00073).
The District Court erred relying upon partial records. The District Court erred relying upon
the Prosecutor's Motion and Order for Bench Warrant for Probation Violation, issued ex
parte, and the Bench Warrant and not considering the Affidavits of Philip Dieter, Lori
Dieter, and Paul Richard Bearce, the Defendant's employer.

The District Court was

aware that Judge Newhouse had terminated and dissolved the Defendant's Order of
Probation. It was aware that in doing so, Judge Newhouse found that the Defendant
had substantially complied with the terms and conditions of his probation. The District
Court chose not to apply this ruling to the identical issue before it.

On January 14, 2011, Appellant's counsel filed a Notice of Appearance, Request for
Evidentiary Hearing, and Notice of Evidentiary Hearing. (R.000075-000080). The
hearing was held February 4, 2011. (Tr. Pg. 1-49). On February 17, 2011, the District
Court entered its Memorandum and Order Concerning Motion to Dismiss at the End of
Probation. (R.000124-000129). It again denied the Appellant's motion but removed
"failure to comply with the terms of probation" as a basis for the denial. It found that the
decision entered by Judge Newhouse October 9, 1992 was the law of the case. It made
an independent finding that the Appellant had complied with the terms of his probation
and was a law abiding citizen. (Ibid. pg 3, R000126).
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The Memorandum states:
"There has never been a judicial finding that the defendant violated any
condition of probation, but a motion was filed by the prosecutor in August,
1992 alleging various technical violations not amounting to criminal
conduct. In September 1992, the defendant filed a motion to "dissolve
probation". Following a hearing, Judge Newhouse entered an order on
October 9, 1992, dissolving and terminating probation. In the order, Judge
Newhouse found that the defendant "has substantially complied with the
order (of probation}." Judge Newhouse's finding necessarily is the law of
the case.
There is nothing in the record showing that the defendant has not been a
law-abiding citizen between October 1992 and the current date. The
defendant now is in his 50's. He is partially disabled due to one or more
industrial accidents and also suffers from dyslexia. He is married and
lives in the State of Montana. The defendant is particularly concerned that
recent changes in Montana law may make information about his past
conduct known to the public.
The parties have agreed that I.C. Section 18-8304, concerning registration
in Idaho of persons sentenced for certain sexual offenses, does not apply
to this case, because the order withholding judgment was entered prior to
July 1, 1993, the effective date of I.C. Section 18-8304.
While the defendant appears to have complied with his conditions of
probation, the court must also decide whether dismissal is compatible with
the public interest. That the defendant appears to have been a law
abiding citizen from 1989 through the current date is a significant factor. .. "
(R.000125-000126).
The District Court asserted that it had discretion to grant or deny the Appellant's motion
to dismiss, stating:
"The decision whether to grant a dismissal is discretionary, provided that
the defendant meets the requirements of I.C. Section 19-2604(1). Ibid.
pg 3. (R.000126).
Recognizing that the court has discretion in this area, the court
nevertheless concludes that there has not been a showing that dismissal
of the charge is compatible with the public interest. The public interest
requires the continued protection afforded by the original guilty plea."
(R.000127, pgA).
The District Court is in error. It does not have jurisdiction to amend or modify the final
orders entered by a prior District Court. State of Idaho vs. Hartwig. 2011 Opinion No.9
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(Idaho 2011).

Original jurisdiction and discretion were properly exercised by the trial

court with its Order Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation entered December
16, 1988, its Second Amended Order Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation
entered June 21, 1990, and in the Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving Order of
Probation, and Entering Order Withholding Judgment, entered October 9, 1992. This
District Court does not have the jurisdiction to change these final Orders.

The District Court has no discretion in this case. The statutory discretion in this case
was properly exercised by the original District Court in the Order Withholding Judgment
and Order of Probation, entered December 16, 1988, the Second Amended Order
Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation, entered June 21, 1990, and the Order
Terminating Probation, Dissolving Order of Probation, and Entering Order Withholding
Judgment, entered October 9, 1992.

This District Court held that Judge Newhouse's decision, that the Appellant complied
with the Order of Probation, was the law of the case.

This District Court also

independently found that the Appellant had complied with the terms of his probation.
Memorandum and Order Concerning Motion to Dismiss at the End of Probation.
(R. 000 125-000 126).

The District Court found that the Appellant was a resident of Montana and that the
Appellant had been a law abiding citizen since 1989.

The District Court found no facts upon which it could rely to deny the Appellant's motion
to dismiss. It relied only upon the original guilty plea, entered as part of the Appellant's
plea bargaining.

The Motion to Reconsider was filed March 3, 2011. (R.000130-000163).

The Motion to Reconsider was denied by Memorandum and Order Concerning Motion
to Reconsider. March 8, 2011. (R000164-166).
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The Notice of Appeal was filed April 1,2011. (R.000167).
An Amended Notice of Appeal was filed April 19, 2011. (R.000173).

Issues on Appeal
1. Does the District Court have the jurisdiction or discretion to amend or modify the
final orders entered by the original District Court in 1988, 1990, and 1992?
2. Must the District Court comply with the mandatory dismissal orders of the original
District Court?
3. Did the District Court err in refusing to grant the Appellant's motion for dismissal?

Argument

1. The District Court does not have the jurisdiction or discretion to amend or modify the
final orders entered by Judge Newhouse in 1988, 1990 and 1992.

The District Court entered its Order Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation
December 16, 1988. The Order of Probation was for a 5 year period. The Order
Withholding Judgment was for the same 5 year period. Upon expiration of the Order
Withholding Judgment, and upon a showing that the Appellant had complied with the
terms of the Order for Probation, the Order Withholding Judgment required that the
case "shall be dismissed". On June 21, 1990, a Second Amended Order Withholding
Judgment and Ordering Probation was entered. The probation terms were enlarged to
allow the Appellant full contact with minors in public places and with his new nuclear
family.

The period of years for the Order of Probation and the Order Withholding

Judgment was not amended. The provision which required that the Appellant's case
"shall be dismissed" was not amended. The Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving
Order of Probation, and Entering Order Withholding Judgment was entered October 9,
1992.

It dissolved and terminated the Order of Probation.

Withheld Judgment.

It entered the Order for

One year remained before it expired.
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The provision which

mandated dismissal of the Appellant's case was reaffirmed. Each of the three Orders
entered by District Judge Robert Newhouse is a final order. No Order was appealed.
The present District Court ruling amends and removes the mandated provision for
dismissal of the case. It nullifies the Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving Order of
Probation, and Entering Order Withholding Judgment. The District Court does not have
the jurisdiction to amend or modify a final Order. State of Idaho vs, Hartwig, 2011
Opinion NO.9 (Idaho 2011).

2. Judge Robert Newhouse properly exercised judicial discretion in the Order
Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation entered December 16, 1988, the
Second Amended Order Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation, entered
June 21, 1990, and the Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving Order of Probation,
and Entering Order Withholding Judgment entered October 9, 1992.

The District Court entered its Order Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation
December 16,1988. The extant statute was Section 19-2601(3) I.C., which authorized
a court to:
"3. Withhold judgment on such terms and for such time as it may
prescribe and may place the defendant on probation;" 1971, ch.97, § 2,
pg.210.
The Appellant was placed on probation for 5 years and was given a withheld judgment
for the same 5 year period. Upon expiration of the Order Withholding Judgment, and
upon a showing that Mr. Dieter had complied with the terms of the Order of Probation,
the Order Withholding Judgment required that his case be dismissed. The statute was
amended in 1989 as follows:
"Sec. 19-2604. I.C. Discharge of Defendant - 1. If sentence has been
imposed but suspended, or if sentence has been withheld, upon application
of the defendant and upon satisfactory showing that the defendant has at all
times complied with the terms and conditions upon which he was placed on
probation, the court may, if convinced by the showing made that there is no
longer cause for continuing the period of probation, and if it be compatible
with the public interest, terminate the sentence or set aside the plea of guilty
or conviction of the defendant, and finally dismiss the case and discharge
the defendant; and this shall apply to cases in which defendants have been
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convicted and granted probation by the court before this law goes into
effect, as well as to cases which arise thereafter. The final dismissal of the
case as herein provided shall have the effect of restoring the defendant to
his civil rights." (emphasis added). See 1989, ch.305, § 1, pg.759.
By the term "may", the statute gives a District Court the discretion to dismiss the case
but does not require the District Court to do so.

Judge Newhouse exercised that

discretion when he established the mandatory dismissal provision in the Order
Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation entered December 16, 1988.

Judge

Newhouse exercised that discretion when he reaffirmed the mandatory dismissal
provision in the Second Amended Order Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation
entered June 21, 1990.

The conditions for probation were expanded to give the

Appellant unsupervised contact with minors in public places, and with his new nuclear
family.

The Appellant met all of the conditions of the Second Amended Order

Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation.

Judge Newhouse exercised discretion when he entered the Order Terminating
Probation, Dissolving Order of Probation, and Entering Order Withholding Judgment on
October 9, 1992. The Court exercised discretion when it determined that the Appellant
had substantially complied with the terms of his probation, and then dissolved and
terminated the Order of Probation.

Based upon this determination, the Appellant is

entitled to the restoration of his civil rights pursuant to Sec. 18-310(2), I.C. The Court
exercised discretion when it entered the Order Withholding Judgment October 9, 1992.

On February 17, 2011, the District Court entered its Memorandum and Order
Concerning Motion to Dismiss at the End of Probation. (R.000124-000129). It found
that the prior District Court's determination, that the Appellant had complied with the
terms of probation, was the law of the case.

It made a determination that the

allegations of probation violations in August 1992 were for technical violations only. It
made an independent determination that the Appellant had complied with the terms of
his probation order. The Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving Order of Probation,
and Entering Order Withholding Judgment entered October 9, 1992 is a judicial
determination that the Appellant complied with the terms of his probation. The District
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Court has made the same determination. Memorandum and Order Concerning Motion
to Dismiss at the End of Probation. (R000125-000126).

3. The Idaho Sex Offender Registration Act does not apply to the Appellant.

In 1993, the Idaho Legislature passed the Sex Offender Registration Act, I.C. §§ 188301 to 18-8311. 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 155, § 1, p. 391. The enactment date of
the Act was July 1, 1993. I.C. § 18-8304(1)(d). This Act does not apply to Mr. Dieter as
his Order of Probation was dissolved and terminated on October 9, 1992 prior to its
enactment date. State of Idaho v. Hartwig,

2011 Opinion No.9, p.2. (Idaho 2011),

State of Idaho v. Hardwick, 2011 Opinion No. 31, (Idaho 2011).

4.

If the District Court does have discretion, the manner in which the District Court
arrived at its decision is an abuse of discretion.

There are no current facts in the record to support the District Court's denial of the
Appellant's Motion to Dismiss. There are no current facts which support the District
Court's conclusion that "the public interest requires the continued protection afforded by
the original guilty plea."

The manner in which the District Court has arrived at its

decision to deny the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss is an abuse of discretion. State of
Idaho v. Izaguirre, 186 P.3d 676, 145 Idaho 820 (Idaho ApR., 2008). The District Court
cites the offense in 1986 as the primary basis to deny the Appellant's motion in 2011.
Memorandum and Order Concerning Motion to Dismiss at the End of Probation.
(R000124-000129). The District Court cites the anti-social attitude of the Appellant
during his psychological evaluation in November 1988 and the skepticism of the
evaluator about the Appellant's potential for rehabilitation as a basis to deny the
Appellant's motion in 2011. Memorandum and Order Concerning Motion to Dismiss at
the End of Probation. (R000124-000129). The District Court is unwilling to recognize
that Judge Newhouse considered the psychological evaluation and the Appellant's
potential for rehabilitation when he determined that probation should be ordered and the
judgment be withheld in the Order Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation
entered December 16, 1988. The District Court is unwilling to consider the successful
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rehabilitation that Judge Newhouse specifically recognized in the expanded conditions
of probation set forth in the Second Amended Order Withholding Judgment and
Ordering Probation, entered June 21, 1990. In its Notice of Intent to Deny Motion to
Dismiss, the District Court chose not to consider the full record established by Judge
Newhouse on October 9, 1992 in the Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving Order of
Probation, and Entering Order Withholding Judgment.

Rather this District Court first

held that Appellant had violated his probation based upon an assumption made by the
District Court without supporting evidence. Notice of Intent to Deny Motion to Dismiss.
(R.000071- R.000074).
At the evidentiary hearing in 2011, the District Court received undisputed testimony that
the Appellant had met every condition of probation.

The District Court received

undisputed testimony that granting the Appellant's Motion to Dismiss was in the public
interest.

The District Court reversed its position and held that the Appellant had

complied with the Order of Probation. The District Court held that this was the law of
the case. The District Court made an independent finding that the Appellant had met
the conditions of his probation. However, the District Court chose not to comply with the
mandatory dismissal orders.

Finding no factual basis upon which to deny the

Appellant's motion, the District Court relied upon the guilty plea alone. No consideration
was given for the rehabilitation of the Appellant and the successful completion of all of
his conditions for probation.

Establishing a guilty plea as the "protection standard" for the public would create an
absolute standard which could not be met. Such an absolute standard would nullify and
negate the statutory standards established by Section 19-2604(1), I.C. The manner in
which the District Court has reached its decision to deny the Appellant's Motion to
Dismiss is an abuse of discretion. State of Idaho v. Izaguirre, 186 P.3d 676, 145 Idaho
820 (Idaho App., 2008).
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Conclusion
The District Court has denied the Appellant's motion to dismiss upon the assumption
that it has the discretion to grant or deny the motion. This assumption is in error. The
District Court has neither the jurisdiction nor discretion to amend or modify the Order
Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation entered December 16, 1988, the Second
Amended Order Withholding Judgment and Ordering Probation entered June 21, 1990,
or the Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving Order of Probation, and Entering Order
Withholding Judgment entered October 9, 1992.

Judge Robert Newhouse established the requirements for the mandatory dismissal of
the Appellant's case in the Order Withholding Judgment and Order of Probation on
December 16, 1988. Those requirements have been met. A judicial determination was
made on October 9, 1992 by Judge Newhouse that the Appellant had complied with his
terms of probation. This is the law of the case. Order Terminating Probation, Dissolving
Order of Probation, and Entering Order Withholding Judgment.

The Appellant is a law abiding citizen of the State of Montana. He has shown that he
has been rehabilitated and that he is a valued and respected person in his community.
Appellant respectfully requests that the Idaho Supreme Court direct the District Court to
comply with Judge Newhouse's Orders and grant the Motion to Dismiss.
~L
Dated th~2day of October, 2011.

BRAY LAW OFFICES CHTD.

Christopher D. 'y
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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and correct copy of the attached APPELLANT'S BRIEF by causing a copy addressed
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JESSICA M. LORELLO
DEPUTY ATIORNEY GENERAL
to be placed in the DEPUTY ATIORNEY GENERAL'S basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

Christopher D. ray
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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